





































































22	Here	is	a	further	note	about	the	heterogeneity	of	hinges.	Ashton	(2019)	points	out	that	factors	like	race	and	gender,	as	well	as	e.g.	locality,	the	narrowest	factor	that	I	consider	here,	can	contribute	to	the	justification	that	a	subject	has,	and	probably	also	to	the	hinges	that	a	subject	has.	This	seems	like	an	important	point	to	keep	in	mind	for	theorists	developing	their	own	hinge	epistemologies	today	and	going	forwards.	I	don’t	include	these	factors	in	this	discussion	because	(in	this	paper)	I	am	one	of	the	writers	on	hinges	focusing	on	what	Ashton	calls	“faithfulness”:	“whether	or	not	the	account	[of	hinges]	faithfully	reconstructs	the	text	of	On	Certainty	and	accurately	represents	Wittgenstein’s	intentions.”	(p.	155)	To	my	knowledge,	his	hinges	sometimes	seem	local,	and	sometimes	 seem	personal,	but	don’t	 seem	 to	 concern	social	 categories,	which	would	 stand	 in	between	those	two	levels	of	specificity.		
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	 I	will	close	with	considering	a	couple	of	potential	objections.	First,	my	notion	of	what	it	is	to	be	in	the	human	bounds	of	sense	is	in	fact	so	broad	that	it	will	include,	say,	hypothetical	intelligent	Martians	who	know	nothing	of	what	Moyal-Sharrock	included	in	the	human	form	of	life	–	for	instance,	the	hinge	proposition	that	humans	cannot	turn	into	birds	-	but	who	are	capable	of	participating	in	complex	language	games	of	their	own.	And	perhaps	such	a	notion	of	the	human	form	of	life	seems	too	broad.			 This	line	of	thought	is	mistaken.	Moyal-Sharrock’s	account	of	the	human	form	of	life	focuses	too	much	on	biological	trivia	(“humans	cannot	turn	into	birds,	“human	babies	need	to	be	cared	for”).	But	what	seems	to	be	genuinely	important	about	the	bounds	of	sense	is	something	other	than	a	hinge	concerning	biological	trivia.	From	the	Wittgensteinian	perspective,	in	any	case,	what	matters	are	things	like	rationality,	complexity	of	thought,	and	the	ability	to	communicate.	Agents	with	these	features	and	abilities	stand	within	the	bounds	of	sense,	and	those	who	lack	them	stand	without	those	bounds.	If	there	turn	out	to	be	Martians	with	language	games	of	their	own,	then	surely	they	belong	in	the	bounds	of	sense,	just	as	much	as	a	human	that	can	participate	in	language	games	but	that	doesn’t	know	anything	about	the	brain.			 Secondly,	I	will	consider	an	objection	about	whether	my	interpretation	of	Wittgenstein	violates	his	constraints	on	philosophizing.		I	have	argued,	so	far,	for	two	independent	claims.	First,	I	have	argued	that	Moyal-Sharrock’s	list	of	universal	hinges	simply	seems	too	long,	and	to	draw	the	bounds	of	human	sense	too	narrowly.	Second,	I	have	argued	that	we	can	use	an	explanatory,	predictive	account	of	hinges	to	understand	Wittgenstein’s	actual	account	of	the	universal	hinges.	This	explanatory	and	predictive	account	is	motivated	by	Wittgenstein’s	various	remarks	about	hinges.	Given	Wittgenstein’s	frequent	exhortations	to	describe	rather	than	explain:	for	instance,	“I	want	to	say	here	that	it	can	never	be	our	job	to	reduce	anything	to	anything,	or	to	explain	anything.	Philosophy	really	is	‘purely	descriptive’.”	(1958	p.	18),	one	might	wonder	whether	I	have	offered	an	un-Wittgensteinian	explication	of	Wittgenstein’s	views.	However,	it	is	not	my	claim	that	he	endorsed	this	explanatory	account	explicitly.	Thus,	I	am	not	claiming	that	Wittgenstein	set	out	to	violate	his	dictum	against	explaining.	Instead,	I	have	argued	that	–	perhaps	
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surprisingly	-	doing	some	explaining	can	help	us	understand	Wittgenstein’s	concept	of	the	universal	hinges.				 More	broadly,	I	think	we	should	expect	different	styles	of	philosophizing	to	be	suitable	to	different	contexts,	and	that	in	some	contexts	more	or	less	explanation	might	be	called	for.	As	my	work	in	this	paper	shows	us,	this	particular	context	is	one	in	which	some	description	and	some	explanation	can,	together,	help	us	achieve	our	goal	of	understanding	the	universal	hinges.	
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